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Abstract 
 
The Signature Record Type Definition was 
released by the Near Field Communication (NFC) 
Forum to provide integrity and authenticity to the 
NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF). It achieves 
this goal by adding a digital signature and 
corresponding certificates to the NDEF message.  
Although the Signature Record Type Definition 
(Signature RTD) specifies the use of strong 
cryptographic algorithms like RSA, DSA and 
ECDSA, a few vulnerabilities have been discovered 
in its implementation.  A recently published Record 
Composition Attack by Roland et al. (2011) 
describes how data can be modified in an NDEF 
message by exploiting the Type Name Format (TNF) 
field even though the NDEF message is protected by 
a Signature Record.  
This paper takes a close look at the attack and 
points out that, apart from the TNF value, a few 
other fields of the NDEF header must also be 
manipulated in order to implement this attack 
successfully. It is shown how to do this and some 
necessary modifications to the signature scheme are 
proposed in order to counter such attacks. Our main 
contribution is proposing a revision to the Signature 
specification by signing more fields but keeping the 
existing NDEF specification.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The format of Near Field Communication (NFC) 
messages is covered by the NFC Data Exchange 
Format (NDEF) specification [1], published by the 
NFC Forum, and signatures on such messages are 
defined by the Forum's Signature Record Type 
Definition (Signature RTD) in [2]. This paper takes a 
critical look at the signature specification, explores 
some of its vulnerabilities and proposes 
countermeasures to two straightforward attacks on 
signed messages under the current NFC 
specifications.  
 
The first part introduces technical aspects of Near 
Field Communication (NFC), including the format 
for NFC messages and the originally proposed digital 
signature scheme [2]. After this, two attacks on the 
signature scheme by Roland  et al. [3]  are presented 
and some missing critical detail is identified. The 
first novel contribution is a fuller presentation of 
their Record Composition attack which now 
certainly succeeds. More significantly, however, we 
need to propose a revision of the signature scheme 
which is essential to counter both of Roland's 
attacks. Some detailed discussion is required to 
justify the inclusion of various new elements and to 
explain their construction. 
Lastly, we also need to discuss implementation 
issues arising from our proposed modifications in 
order to integrate them within the current 
infrastructure.  
Our original conference report [12] on the attacks 
suggested the necessity for a revision of the NDEF 
specification. Here, we manage to avoid this, with its 
attendant implications for the existing NFC 
infrastructure, by making some further changes to 
the proposals for the signature scheme.  However, 
this proposed revision to the signature specification 
is nevertheless a significant result because of its 
implications for extending and renewing the current 
NFC infrastructure. 
 
2. Near Field Communication 
 
Near Field Communication (NFC) is a short-
range wireless technology compatible with 
contactless smart cards (ISO/IEC 14443) and radio-
frequency identification (RFID) [4]. NFC is on the 
13.56 MHz frequency band and operates at a 
distance of less than 4 cm. It uses magnetic field 
induction for communication and powering the chip.  
NFC technology has a number of applications 
such as ticketing and payment, retrieving information 
from information kiosks or setting up connections 
between devices (so called device pairing). A wide 
variety of applications is possible using the 
International Journal for Information Security Research (IJISR), Volume 2, Issues 1/2, March/June 2012 
Copyright © 2012, Infonomics Society                                                                                                                                       326 
 
technology because of the different operation modes 
supporting both communication from device to 
device (peer-to-peer mode), communication between 
a device and a passive tag (read/write mode) and an 
emulation mode where a device can act like a 
contactless smart card [5].  
NFC technology is now available on cell phones 
resulting in a sharp rise in its use. It makes life easier 
and more convenient for consumers around the world 
by making it simpler to make transactions, exchange 
digital content, and connect to electronic devices 
with a touch. Multiple modes allow consumers to 
perform contactless transactions, connect to peer 
devices for data sharing or interact with a variety of 
contactless “smart objects” through their mobile 
devices. For example, a customer could initiate the 
process of buying a cinema ticket by touching his 
NFC mobile phone against a smart movie poster. 
NFC technology provides the capability for ticketing, 
banking and other applications, which were 
historically installed on contactless security tokens, 
to be implemented on mobile devices. These 
functionalities allow NFC-enabled mobile phones to 
be used as if they were contactless smart tokens, e.g. 
for retail payments at point of sale (POS) terminals 
or swiping an e-ticket at a turnstile. They also 
provide the opportunity for a single device to contain 
multiple tokens [6]. This technology is highly 
suitable for monetary transactions (especially micro-
payments) because of its shorter range and 
compatibility with contactless smart cards.  
 
3. The NFC Forum 
 
The NFC Forum was established in 2004 to 
standardize applications which use NFC [7]. The 
NFC Forum promotes sharing, pairing, and 
transactions between NFC devices or tags. In June 
2006, the Forum formally outlined the architecture of 
NFC technology. One such use of NFC tags is in so-
called Smart Posters. These contain information such 
as the Title, an SMS, and a URL or electronic 
business card. The user can access this information 
simply by touching his cell phone on such tags. 
Apart from displaying the information to the user, 
the smart poster can also trigger an action such as 
opening a specific website, calling the telephone 
number stored in the poster, etc [8]. (This should, of 
course, be subject to the consent of the user’s 
security policy settings.) 
With the increasing number of available 
applications of NFC technology, threats of its abuse 
are also emerging in parallel. In the case of abuses 
related to smart posters, an attacker may replace the 
URL address or the telephone number with malicious 
content. Consequently, it is essential to guarantee the 
integrity and authenticity of NFC data. 
The NFC Forum developed the Signature Record 
Type Definition (Signature RTD) in 2010 to fix such 
problems [2]. Its main objective is to digitally sign 
the data fields of an NDEF message, thus providing 
integrity and authenticity. 
 
3.1. NFC Data Exchange Format 
 
The NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) 
specification defines a common format and rules to 
exchange information in the NFC environment. 
NDEF is a lightweight, binary message format that 
can be used to encapsulate one or more application-
defined payloads of arbitrary type and size into a 
single message construct. Each payload is described 
by a type, its length, and an optional identifier. A 
record is the unit for carrying the payload within an 
NDEF message. An NDEF message contains one or 
more NDEF records [1]. The structure of an NDEF 
record is shown in Figure 1.    
The Message Begin (MB) and Message End (ME) 
bits indicate the first and the last record of an NDEF 
message respectively. The Chunk Flag (CF) specifies 
that the payload of that record is continued in the 
next record. Short Record (SR) is a 1-bit flag which, 
if set, indicates that the size of the Payload-Length 
field is one byte. In this case, the size of Payload is 
restricted to between 0 and 255 bytes. Otherwise, the 
Payload-Length field consists of 4 bytes (as shown 
in Figure 1) and it determines a Payload size ranging 
from 0 to 2
32
-1 bytes. The flag IL determines 
whether or not the optional ID field and 
corresponding ID-Length field are present.   
The Type Name Format (TNF) is a 3-bit field 
indicating the structure of the Type field which gives 
the type of Payload. Its value ranges between 0 and 7 
with meaning as shown in Table 1. Type-Length and 
Figure 1. NDEF Record Layout ([1], fig. 3) 
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ID-Length are unsigned 8-bit integers that specify the 
length in octets of the Type field and ID field 
respectively. The Type field describes the type of 
Payload, and the optional ID field is a URI 
reference. 
 
Table 1. Type Name Format (TNF) 
Description (cf [1], table 1) 
TNF Meaning 
0 
The record is empty and there is no 
payload or type associated with this 
record. The corresponding length fields 
are set to zero. This TNF value can be 
used whenever an empty record is needed. 
1 
Indicates that the Type field contains a 
value that satisfies the RTD type name 
format defined in the NFC Forum RTD 
specification, such as Smart poster RTD, 
Signature RTD, URL RTD etc. 
2 
Type is a MIME media type identifier 
(RFC 2406). 
3 Type is an absolute URI (RFC 3986). 
4 Type is an NFC Forum external type. 
5 
Type is of unknown format. It is used 
when the type of the payload is unknown. 
When used, the Type-Length field must be 
zero and thus the Type field is omitted. In 
this case, the payload is stored but not 
processed. 
6 
The record continues the payload of the 
preceding chunked record. When used, the 
ID-Length and ID fields are omitted, the 
Type-Length field must be zero and there 
is no Type field. 
7 Reserved for future use. 
 
3.2. Record Chunks 
 
A record chunk carries a chunk of a payload. It 
can be used to partition dynamically generated 
contents or very large entities into multiple 
sequential record chunks within an NDEF message. 
Every chunked payload is encoded as an initial 
record chunk followed by zero or more middle 
record chunks and concluded with a terminating 
record chunk [1]. 
 The initial record chunk has its CF flag set. The 
Type field and the ID field (if present) indicate the 
Type and ID of the entire payload respectively. The 
Payload-Length field indicates the size of payload of 
the initial record only.  
The middle and terminating record chunks do not 
have Type and ID fields as these are already 
indicated in the initial chunk. Their TNF field value 
is 6, indicating that the Type and ID are the same as 
for the initial record chunk. Their Type-Length and 
ID-Length fields are zero and absent respectively. 
The CF is set for middle chunks and is clear for the 
terminating chunk.  
 
4. The Signature Record Type Definition 
 
The Signature Record Type Definition specifies 
the format used when signing single or multiple 
NDEF records [2]. It defines a list of suitable 
algorithms and certificate types that can be used to 
create the signature. It provides users with the 
possibility of verifying the authenticity and integrity 
of the data within the NDEF message. 
 
4.1. The Signature Record 
 
The contents of the payload of a signature record 
consist of three parts: Version, digital Signature and 
Certificate Chain as shown in Figure 2. The Version 
is a single byte field indicating the version of the 
specification to which a signature is compliant. 
Currently the only valid version is 1. The Signature 
field contains either the actual signature or a URI 
reference to a signature. The signature RTD supports 
RSA, DSA and ECDSA. The Certificate Chain 
contains the certificate format, the total number of 
certificates, the list of certificates and an optional 
URI reference. 
 
4.2. Use of the Signature Record in an NDEF 
Message 
 
The signature record applies to all preceding 
records, starting either from the first record of an 
NDEF message or from the first record following the 
preceding signature record as shown in Figure 3. 
Signature Record 1 signs Records 1 and 2. It also 
marks the start of the signature of Record 3. 
Signature Record 2 signs Record 3 only whereas 
Record 4 has no signature. The signature is applied 
to the Type, ID (if present) and Payload of these 
records. The NDEF header and length fields are not 
signed as shown in Table 2. 
In case where only a selection of records in an 
NDEF message is required to be signed, an empty 
signature record can be inserted into the record 
sequence to act as a start marker. An empty signature 
record has TNF=1 (as it is NFC Forum well-known 
Figure 2. Payload of an NDEF signature 
record, based on [3], fig. 2 
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type record), Type as 'Sig' and there is no payload 
associated with this record. Such a record indicates 
that the preceding records back to the start or the 
previous signature record are unsigned.  
 
Table 2. Signing an NDEF Record ([2], §3.4) 
Field Name Signed/Unsigned 
Message Begin (MB) Not Signed 
Message End (ME) Not Signed 
Chunk Flag (CF) Not Signed 
Short Record (SR) Flag Not Signed 
ID-Length (IL) Present Flag Not Signed 
Type Name Format (TNF) Not Signed 
Type-Length Not Signed 
Payload-Length Not Signed 
ID-Length Not Signed 
Type Signed 
ID  Signed 
Payload Signed 
 
5. Related Work 
 
Haselsteiner [9] discovered that the transmission 
between the tag and the reader can be modified by an 
attacker. He pointed out that all the transmitted bits 
can be modified if Manchester coding with 10% 
ASK is used whereas, for Miller encoding with 
100% ASK, this attack is feasible for certain bits but 
impossible for others. A strong synchronization is 
required between the attacker’s device and legitimate 
devices to implement this attack, making it less than 
practicable. However, the concern here is mostly 
over reading tags with illegitimate content rather 
than the subversion of content during transmission. 
Madlmayr [5] indicates that the NDEF data is 
prone to various attacks if proper protection is not 
used. Roland [10] carried out an analysis regarding 
signing an NDEF message. He provides the 
justification for signing a few selected fields of an 
NDEF message. Roland in [3] exploits some 
vulnerabilities of the Signature RTD. 
Mulliner [4] analyzes the security of NFC-
enabled mobile phones. He takes into account not 
only the NFC-subsystem but also software 
components that can be controlled through the NFC-
interface. The author used the Fuzzing technique to 
test the NFC software of the Nokia 6131. He found 
that an NDEF payload length field with values 
0xFFFFFFFF and 0xFFFFFFFE causes the phone 
to crash and reset. He also exploits the size of the 
display screen to launch some attacks on the smart 
poster. 
Verdult and Kooman [11] demonstrate some 
practical attacks on the Nokia 6212 Classic. It allows 
users to exchange digital objects easily using the 
NFC interface. To do so, two phones should be 
within the proximity coupling distance of about 5 
cms. This paper shows that the NFC feature that 
invokes a Bluetooth connection without user consent 
can be abused to install malicious software secretly 
on the phone. This results in a serious vulnerability 
when smart posters start installing malicious 
software or spreading viruses. 
Francis et al. [6] investigate the possibility that a 
Near Field Communication (NFC) enabled mobile 
phone, with an embedded secure element (SE), could 
be used as an attack platform. They showed how an 
NFC mobile phone can be used for a tag cloning and 
skimming attack. Their findings indicate that the 
embedded SE with the existing security controls and 
the available contactless APIs could be exploited to 
configure the mobile phone as a contactless attack 
platform. 
 
6. The Record Composition Attack 
 
The Record Composition Attack is aimed at 
composing different records in such a way that the 
digital signature remains valid. There are two 
scenarios described by M. Roland to accomplish this 
attack [3].  
In the first scenario, two different smart posters 
are selected in which every record has its own 
signature. A malicious smart poster record can be 
created by selecting only a few of the records along 
with their signatures from the first poster and other 
records along with their signatures from the second 
poster. Similarly, unrelated records along with their 
respective signatures from a number of different 
posters can be combined together into a single NDEF 
message. The combined NDEF message will consist 
of a sequence of records that may be totally 
meaningless or convey misleading information, but 
still have valid signatures covering the whole 
message. 
In the second scenario, the Record Composition 
Attack is accomplished by combining and hiding 
selected records from different NDEF messages. An 
adversary takes two or more smart poster records 
signed by the same or different parties. Each smart 
poster consists of records of various types like Text, 
URI etc. followed by the signature. The attacker 
takes all records from the posters and combines them 
to form a new smart poster record. The new poster 
will have valid signature records corresponding to 
data from each parent tag. The attacker then 
effectively removes the unwanted records from the 
Figure 3. An NDEF message consisting of 
multiple records [3], fig. 3. 
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message by hiding them from the viewer, but keeps 
the signatures valid. 
As all the records are digitally signed, the actual 
removal of any record invalidates the signature. 
Instead, the chosen records are retained but hidden 
from the user by manipulating the unsigned TNF 
field. The TNF value is changed from 1 to 5, i.e. 
from an NFC Forum well-known type to an unknown 
type. The TNF value can be changed as it is not 
signed. The NDEF parser receiving an NDEF record 
with a TNF value of Unknown will store the Payload 
of that record without processing it. In this case the 
Payload will not appear to the user. So, rather than 
removing a record, it has been hidden simply by 
changing the TNF value. 
 
7. The Amended Attack 
 
In fact, Roland’s attack [3] described thus far does 
not necessarily work because there are a few other 
changes that may have to be carried out in order to 
keep the signature valid. These necessary 
modifications were overlooked in [3]. 
For the new TNF=5 of the hidden records, the 
Type-Length field must be zero and there can be no 
Type field (see Table 1). This is not the case for the 
original record (TNF ≠0,6). As the Type-Length field 
is not signed it can indeed be changed to zero, but 
the Type and ID fields are digitally signed and 
omitting or altering these fields to maintain a 
meaningful payload may invalidate the signature. 
Specifically, in order for the signature to remain 
valid, the original signature on the string 
Type||ID||Payload has to be the same as the 
signature on the new string ID'||Payload'. These 
strings must therefore be identical, with its initial 
interpretation replaced by one with a different, 
possibly invalid ID' and a new, probably 
meaningless, message Payload'. Quite apart from the 
semantic issues, the signature verification now fails 
unless the number of signed bytes is the same, i.e. 
 
(Type-Length) + (ID-Length) + (Payload-Length)  
=  (ID-Length') + (Payload-Length') 
 
Therefore, apart from changing the TNF value, 
some further manipulation of the NDEF header may 
be required, together with adjustments to the Type-, 
Payload- and ID- lengths and corresponding 
removal, addition or repartitioning of bytes in the 
corresponding three fields. 
When the IL bit is set, one easy solution is to 
increment the original value of the ID-Length or 
Payload-Length field by Type-Length. This 
corresponds to a reallocation of some of the signed 
bytes to the ID and Payload fields. When the IL flag 
is zero this still works providing it is the Payload- 
length field which is incremented by Type-Length as 
mentioned in [10], Section V(L). It works well when 
the ID field is not present, as shown in Figure 4, but 
in the presence of an ID field it results in a new and 
probably invalid ID' field that may be detected by a 
semantic check. No bytes need removing or adding 
to the record in these cases. 
 
We propose another solution, which cannot be 
caught by a semantic check on either the Type field 
or the ID field. Since it has no type, the Payload 
cannot fail a semantic check either.  First set the IL 
flag to zero if it is not already zero, and remove the 
bytes containing the ID-Length, as in Figure 5. Then 
increment Payload-Length by (Type-Length)+(ID-
Length), so that the new Payload consists of the 
concatenation of all the bytes formerly in the Type, 
ID and Payload fields. In this case, Payload' consists 
of all the signed bytes. 
 
8. The Record Decomposition Attack 
 
In the second attack described by Roland et al. in 
[3], the payload is split (but not chunked) into two 
parts and spread over two records. The second part is 
hidden by using a record of unknown type, i.e. 
TNF=5. Since Payload-Length is an unsigned field, 
it can be changed in the first record without 
detection. The signature is computed over the 
concatenated bytes from the Type, ID and Payload of 
all records being signed. So, for the two new records 
to generate the same signature, it just requires the 
second record to have no Type or ID fields. The 
unknown type does this job as a record with an 
unknown type has no Type or ID fields. The only 
thing required to accomplish this attack is the 
suitable completion of the NDEF header fields of the 
new unknown-type record. 
Figure 4. Example changes in the NDEF 
header when the ID field is absent. 
Figure 5. Example changes in the NDEF 
header when the ID field is present. 
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NDEF Record Signature 
Chunk 1 Chunk 2 Chunk n Signature ... 
An example of such an attack is the text of a 
smart poster stating, “Do not board the train until 
you have a valid ticket”. This text is digitally signed 
and the signature is stored using the Signature RTD. 
An attacker may split this message into two separate 
records as above. The first record stating “Do not 
board the train” will be visible to the user, whereas 
the second record stating “until you have a valid 
ticket” will not appear to the user as it is sent with 
the NDEF header fields stating unknown type. 
However, the digital signature will remain valid and 
so the user will consider it as a valid message. This 
attack of Roland works in its original form without 
further modification of length fields such as those 
described in the previous attack. 
 
9. Countermeasures 
 
Roland proposed that the receiver should only 
trust the payload bytes from a sequence of records if 
they are signed and share a common signature record 
[3]. But this needs very careful interpretation. As 
shown in the example of the Record Decomposition 
Attack in §8, the records share a common signature 
but only part of the message payload is displayed to 
the user. This partially displayed message with a 
valid signature cannot be trusted. Hence, the user’s 
view of the message cannot be trusted even if all its 
records share a common signature. 
The easiest way to avoid these attacks would be 
to sign all the header fields so that they may not be 
altered, but in practice this is out of the question. For 
example, the MB flag is intentionally unsigned so 
that a group of signed NDEF records may be moved 
to any position within an NDEF message [10]. This 
enables a variety of messages to be constructed for 
different target viewers around an important core 
content which is signed. However, it is unnecessary 
to sign the ME flag as the end of the section of the 
message which needs to have its integrity secured is 
marked by the signature record, so all the records 
preceding the signature record will have ME = 0. 
A principle requirement of the signature 
definition is to be able to partition an NDEF record 
into multiple record chunks or vice versa as shown in 
Figure 6 without affecting the validity of the 
signature. This means, in particular, that only the 
Payload can be included in the signature for records 
after the first chunk, and that the chunk flag CF must 
be omitted from any header data that is included in 
the signature. The inclusion of any other field from 
the non-initial chunks, such as length fields, TNF or 
CF in the signature would also invalidate the 
signature. The fields from the initial chunk which are 
independent of whether or not the record is chunked 
are the only ones which could be included in the 
signature. They are the MB, IL and TNF fields in the 
header byte, the Type-Length and Type fields, and 
the ID-Length and ID fields. 
However, one could sum the payload lengths 
from each chunk to obtain the same payload length 
as in the unchunked record, and include that in the 
signature because it is unaffected by chunking. This 
needs to be done with care as it should be possible to 
compute the signature using a block by block hash 
function without having to store every chunk 
payload. The message digest and total payload length 
must therefore be computed in parallel and, once the 
last chunk has been read, the length appended as a 
suffix to the string to being hashed. The resulting 
MAC is then signed and, if necessary, validated. 
Another principle which we may wish to respect 
in proposing any revision of specifications is to insist 
that the signature is computed on the same 
components of each record irrespective of chunking. 
This would slightly simplify validation code, as 
would omitting the payload length computation. 
The last principle worth mentioning is the desire 
to compute signatures directly from the concatenated 
record bytes in the order they appear and without 
alteration. It is easy to observe that the attacks above 
would not work if, for example, an extra byte B of 
fixed value were inserted between the Type, ID and 
Payload strings when necessary to separate them 
before the signature is computed. Thus, when none 
of the three components were the empty string, this 
would mean computing the signature of the string 
Type||B||ID||B||Payload, but it would be computed on 
just Payload when both Type and ID were of length 
0. If this were done, the chunking process would not 
disturb the calculation of a signature, but the re-
partitioning of bytes required in the Record 
Composition attack would not work.  This particular 
solution becomes unnecessary if the lengths of the 
various data components are also signed. 
 
9.1. Revision of the Signature Specification 
 
We propose some modifications to the signature 
specification. The signature is presently computed 
over Type, ID and Payload fields as recalled in 
Section 4. Because of the two attacks, the inclusion 
of additional fields is necessary. However, in order 
to preserve the validity of signatures when a record is 
chunked, a different signature process is required for 
non-initial chunks. The proposed modified signature 
is compared to the existing specification in Table 3. 
Figure 6. An NDEF record appended with 
its digital signature is partitioned into 
multiple chunk records. The signature is 
valid for both cases. 
International Journal for Information Security Research (IJISR), Volume 2, Issues 1/2, March/June 2012 
Copyright © 2012, Infonomics Society                                                                                                                                       331 
 
 
Table 3. Comparison of the Existing and the 
Proposed Signature Record Specifications 
Field Name Existing Proposed 
MB Not signed 
ME Not signed 
CF Not signed 
SR Not signed 
IL Not signed 
TNF Not signed 
Signed 
(unless TNF=6) 
Type-Length Not signed 
Signed 
(unless TNF=6) 
Payload-Length Not signed 
Signed (in 
modified form) 
ID-Length Not signed 
Signed 
(if present) 
Type Signed 
ID Signed 
Payload Signed 
 
The first byte of the NDEF header containing 
MB, ME, CF, SR, IL, TNF cannot be added in full to 
the signature as noted earlier. However, making the 
TNF value immutable is wise. Its updating was the 
source of problems in the Record Composition 
attack. So, part of our proposal is to sign this for all 
records except the non-initial chunks. For TNF≠6, 
create a byte TNFB by masking the non-TNF bits 
from the first byte of the record. This byte will be 
signed. TNFB will be the empty string for TNF=6, 
and so not alter the signature when a record is 
chunked. 
Next, we propose adding the Type-Length and 
ID-Length fields to the existing fields for signing 
except in the case of non-initial chunks, i.e. records 
with TNF = 6, when they are to be omitted. Addition 
of these two fields to the signature process does not 
invalidate the signature under the chunking process.  
As noted before, Payload-Length cannot be 
signed unless the length is accumulated over all 
chunks.  Let Total-Payload-Length denote the  sum 
of Payload-Lengths over all chunks of a chunked 
record, and the normal Payload-Length for an 
unchunked record.  For convenience, let us define 
Total-Payload similarly: it is the usual Payload for 
an unchunked record and the concatenation of the 
Payloads from all chunks of a chunked record. This 
means that Total-Payload-Length and Total-Payload 
are simply the Payload-Length and Payload of the 
corresponding unchunked record. 
In our revised signature specification, the 
contribution to the signature of all chunks from a 
chunked record is the following string: 
 
TNFB||Type-Length||ID-Length||Type||ID||  
Total-Payload||Total-Payload-Length. 
 
The TNFB, Type and ID contributions and their 
lengths are, of course, those given in the initial 
chunk. The contribution of an unchunked record is 
the same, but can be written more simply as 
following because it is a single record.  
 
TNFB||Type-Length||ID-Length||Type||ID||  
Payload||Payload-Length. 
 
Because of our definitions of Total-Payload and  
Total-Payload-Length, the contributions to the 
signature are the same for an unchunked record and a 
chunked version of the same record. This means that 
the new signature could be simply defined in terms 
of the concatenated contributions from records in the 
equivalent unchunked message.  
Note, finally, the ambiguity in the string used for 
Total-Payload-Length. This could be up to four 
bytes, and we do not know if the original unchunked 
record used one or four bytes if this length is under 
2
8
. A formal specification would have to determine 
how it should be given, e.g. the endianness at bit and 
byte level using four bytes or using the minimum 
number of bytes. 
 
9.2. Suitability for the Record Chunking 
Process 
 
The proposed signature scheme can be 
successfully used for validating messages with many 
record chunks without the need to store payload data.  
The first half of the contribution from a chunked 
record, namely  
TNFB||Type-Length||ID-Length||Type||ID 
is wholly derived from the initial chunk. Thereafter 
the string for hashing is given by appending the 
chunk Payloads until Total-Payload has been 
appended. At the same time, a record is kept of the 
sum of the Payload-Lengths of the chunks. When the 
last chunk has been received, this sum equals the 
required Total-Payload-Length, and so its value can 
be appended also. 
Therefore, a record may be partitioned into 
multiple chunks or vice versa without affecting the 
validity of the signature or the ease with which the 
signature is computed.  
 
10. Security Analysis of the Proposed 
Specifications 
 
The modifications need to be analyzed for the 
feasibility of an attack and to justify the inclusion of 
the various new fields.  
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10.1. Counter to the Record Composition 
Attack 
 
The main reason for the success of the Record 
Composition Attack was the unsigned NDEF header 
fields that could be manipulated in a specific way to 
accomplish this attack (see Figures 4 and 5). In our 
proposed structure, the TNF, Type-Length, Payload-
Length and ID-Length fields are signed in addition to 
the already signed Type, ID, and Payload fields. So 
these fields can no longer be manipulated in the 
required way. This makes Record Composition 
Attack impossible. 
Specifically, in the terminology of section 7, for 
the same attack to be successful under the new 
signature scheme would require at least Type-Length 
= Type-Length' = 0 and ID-Length = ID-Length' as 
these both fields are signed and cannot be changed. 
However, Type-Length = 0 cannot occur when TNF 
is other than 0, 5 or 6. Although the original attack 
had an initial TNF=1 being changed to TNF=5, we 
should consider the possibility of attacks with these 
other initial values in order to justify (or not) the 
inclusion of TNFB in the proposed signature.  
For TNF=0 the record should be empty. In this 
case the Payload is the empty string and making it 
invisible will not make any difference to what the 
user reads. For TNF=5, an update to TNF=5 also 
makes no difference to the message. Finally, TNF=6 
indicates that the record is a non-initial chunk. 
Changing the field to have the value 5 would change 
it to a non-chunked record and result in the inclusion 
of additional Type-Length and ID-Length fields. 
Although the ID-Length field is optional in a record, 
the Type-Length field is not. It contributes 1 byte in 
the new signature scheme, resulting in a different 
signature if TNF is changed from 6 to 5. We 
conclude that, whatever the initial value of TNF, 
updating it to 5 invalidates the signature under the 
proposed scheme just by virtue of including the 
Type-Length and ID-Length fields, no matter how the 
other fields are changed. 
Of course, the user needs to be aware of where 
signed messages start and finish since any signed 
messages might be combined without change into a 
larger misleading or wrong message. The signature 
specification clearly defines the starting and 
finishing point of the data to be signed. It is up to the 
user’s browser and security policy to make clear 
where signed messages begin and end. Ideally, it 
should show a single signed message at a time and 
indicate that the visible message is signed with 
nothing hidden. 
 
10.2. Counter to the Record Decomposition 
Attack 
 
In this attack, a record payload is decomposed 
into multiple parts which are completed to full 
(unchunked) records by the addition of relevant 
header fields. The TNF value for some parts is set to 
5, making them inactive records. The header fields 
also contain a Type-Length field with value zero. As 
this one-byte field is digitally signed in the proposed 
scheme, it will contribute to the string on which the 
signature is computed and result in an invalid 
signature. The only way to avoid this byte being part 
of the signature is to make the second record into a 
chunk. However, this requires TNF=6 and so 
prevents the value TNF=5 which is needed to hide 
the record’s payload in the attack. Thus, the Record 
Decomposition Attack is successfully countered in 
the proposed scheme. 
The specification for the unknown type record 
with TNF=5 has some redundant data. The Type-
Length field is always zero and therefore redundant. 
This redundancy, in contrast to the record chunking 
case, proves to be a mechanism preventing the 
Record Decomposition Attack. If it were removed, 
the heading requirement for the hidden parts of the 
payload in the Record Decomposition Attack would 
be the first NDEF header byte and the Payload-
Length field. If none of this information were 
included in the revised signature specification, data 
from the header fields would not invalidate the 
signature. Therefore excluding this redundancy 
would make the Record Decomposition Attack 
feasible for the revised signature specification if it 
excluded TNFB and Total-Payload.  
In conclusion, although the Type-Length field is 
redundant in an unknown type record, it helps 
prevent the Record Decomposing Attack. 
Nevertheless, other fields in the proposed signature 
specification ensure that this redundancy could be 
safely removed. 
 
10.3. Other Combinations of Records 
 
This section discusses other potentially malicious 
combinations of records with respect to the proposed 
signature specification. §§10.1 and 10.2 considered 
all possibilities for hiding part of a signed payload. 
One can ask if there are other changes to a sequence 
records which would not affect the signature. The 
first such combination is to sign the last of the 
middle and terminating chunks (and perhaps more 
subsequent records) while omitting the initial and the 
first few middle chunks. Although the signature 
specification only covers the complete sequence of 
chunks, it could be abused, with the first chunk to be 
signed being treated as the initial chunk, contributing 
its values for the ID and Type, among other things. 
This combination might have its Type and ID 
properties changed since they are inherited from the 
initial chunk which may not have been signed. 
However, such a change is not allowable according 
to the NDEF specification [1]. This is because the 
first record in a sequence of signed records must be 
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the first record of the message or be preceded by a 
signature record. As a signature record cannot be a 
chunk (it has TNF=1, not 6), the start of the signed 
sequence of records must be before the initial chunk. 
Consequently, the Type and ID properties and their 
lengths are always signed for the part of the payload 
which is signed. 
Let us now consider manipulation of the 
unsigned bits in the first header byte. We can ignore 
the MB and ME flags as they do not affect the 
semantic content of the records. 
Any alteration to the SR bit changes the location 
of the other signed bytes, such as the Payload. This 
leads to an invalid signature unless there is a 
corresponding addition or removal of three Payload-
Length bytes. If this changes the value of Payload-
Length then the signature will be incorrect as that 
value is signed.  If that value is unchanged then the 
Payload is unchanged, so that the interpretation of 
the record is unchanged.  Hence if the SR  bit can be 
changed without invalidating the signature then the 
message content is unchanged. 
Switching the IL bit without invalidating the 
signature is not possible except for non-initial chunks 
where the value is irrelevant. Moreover, the IL flag is 
always zero for non-initial chunks as defined in the 
NDEF specification [1].  Changing IL introduces a 
byte for ID-Length into the signature stream or 
removes it, thereby altering the signature. 
Finally, we briefly comment on the need to 
include the TNF value in the signature. For example, 
without TNFB, any of the values 1, 2, 3, 4 might be 
inter-changed without change to the sequence of 
bytes being signed. This would lead to a different 
interpretation of the Type value and hence a different 
interpretation of the Payload. We would then have to 
rely on the parser flagging an inconsistency. It is 
quite possible, although unlikely, for the differently 
interpreted payload to convey incorrect information 
to the user.  Thus it is still wise to include TNFB in 
the signature scheme.  
 
11. Implementation Issues 
 
11.1. Modification to the Signature 
Specification 
 
The proposed signature scheme is different from 
the existing one because of the addition of, inter alia,  
Type-Length and ID-Length fields. As such, it must 
be assigned a different version number in order to 
maintain backward compatibility. Fortunately, in this 
specification there is a version number which can be 
incremented. 
The payload of the signature RTD consists of 
three fields as noted in §4, Fig 2: Version, Signature 
and Certificate Chain. These three fields are 
transmitted in the same order, with Version in first 
place. An NDEF parser can determine the signature 
specification by first analyzing the version number. 
This is a single byte field so it can handle up to 256 
versions of signature specification. As the existing 
signature specification is the only version presently 
available, the only currently valid version number is 
1. So our proposed signature specification should be 
given version number 2. 
The proposed specification is not compatible 
with version 1 because of the extra signed fields. 
Hence signature validators will have to be upgraded 
to enable version 2 signatures to be checked. 
 
11.2. Modifying the NDEF Specification 
 
Implementing changes in the NDEF specification 
is tricky as there is no Version field available in the 
NDEF format. This could be implemented by adding 
a single byte version number prefix with most 
significant bit 0 to distinguish it from the initial byte 
of the first record which has MB flag set to 1. 
Alternatively a complete version record could be 
constructed with additional details for parsing the 
information efficiently. However, it seems sensible 
to avoid changing both the NDEF and Signature 
RTD specifications when it is only necessary to 
change one of them. 
 
11.3. The User Interface 
 
A digitally signed NDEF message should display 
some information for the user at the application 
level. It may include the name of the signing 
authority (from an x.509 certificate) with some 
additional details for the assurance of the user. 
Our consideration of security issues showed that 
it is still important for users to be informed whether 
or not messages have been signed and for their 
browsers to make clear where individual signed 
messages begin and end. It should not be possible for 
signed messages to be concatenated without the user 
being aware where one message has finished and the 
next has started.  
A signature can potentially be removed from a 
tag without any indication to the user (such as in a 
duplicate tag). It is up to the user whether he trusts 
the contents of a message without a signature or not. 
However, it is clear from the example attacks that the 
browser should be pro-active in warning the user of 
potential dangers, including the lack of any 
signature. 
 
12. Conclusion 
 
The Record Composition and Decomposition 
Attacks exploit unsigned fields in the NDEF header. 
Previously proposed attacks were not fully 
implementable without further modifications to these 
header fields. We refined those attacks and explained 
precisely what additional changes need to be made to 
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exploit the unsigned fields. Such attacks can be 
countered if the length fields of the NDEF header are 
also signed. We proposed a solution that requires 
modification to the Signature RTD in which, 
amongst others, the TNF, Type-Length, Payload-
Length and ID-Length fields are included. We 
presented a security analysis of the proposed scheme, 
and verified that it was no longer possible to exploit 
the NDEF header in attacks of the type discussed, 
thus successfully countering Record Composition 
and Decomposition Attacks in particular. Inclusion 
of the TNF field accounted for some remaining 
semantic issues. Because of their impracticality, we 
discarded alternative solutions involving updating 
the NDEF specification. 
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